일신교적 신정론에 대한 비판적 연구논문
라이프니츠의 가능세계 신정론과 루터의 영혼-조력 신정론의 정당성에 관하여
Numerous theodicies have been proposed to explicate how seemingl righteous people face tribulations despite the existence of a good and just God. Among these, two unique branches of theodicy, the “Best Possible World” theodicy and the “Soul-Building” theodicy, were proposed by seventeenth century philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and sixteenth century theologian Martin Luther (1483-1546). They both provide some insightful explanations with regard to the compatibility of good and evil: Leibniz believes that the world we live in is the best possible world that God can ever create,[1] while Luther views suffering as something that helps us grow in faith in God and mature not only in a physical and/or a material sense, but also in a spiritual sense.[2] In this research paper, while both versions of theodicies suggested by Leibniz and Luther indeed have weaknesses and strengths, I will attempt to argue against Leibniz’s theodicy and how Luther’s version of theodicy, although imperfect, is more promising.
Why do good people suffer and, given that God is perfectly good, how can God and evil coexist in the world? Leibniz answers this question by emphasizing the necessity of the evil, and that this world is the only best possible world there can be:
<Now [God’s] supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less infinite, cannot but have chosen the best. For as a lesser evil is a kind of good, even so a lesser good is a kind of evil if it stands in the way of a greater good; and there would be something to correct in the actions of God if it were possible to do better. As in mathematics, when there is no maximum nor minimum, in short nothing distinguished, everything is done equally, or when that is not possible nothing at all is done: so it may be said likewise in respect of perfect wisdom, which is no less orderly than mathematics, that if there were not the best among all possible worlds, God would not have produced any.>[3]
Leibnizian description on the relationship of the God and evilhere is indeed a clever one, for, through his argument, Leibniz shows that (1) this world is the only best possible world there can be, that (2) evil is, accordingly, indispensable subset of reality, (3) such indispensability of worldly evil is only possible by God's permission,[4] and (4) while God is a good judge, according to Leibnizian theodicy, He is also a just judge.[5] So it is irrational to blame God for a necessary evil, as all worldly evil began by the abuse of free will.[6] Leibniz’s Best Possible World theodicy is, unfortunately, in every respect, vulnerable─both logically and theologically. To begin with, it needs to be pointed out that Leibnizian theodicy is relying on the following (groundless) proposition:
(K) If God is perfect, then, for any world that He can possibly create, if He creates one, that world is the best possible world there can be.
It is incontrovertible that God of the Bible, if he exists, must be omnipotent. But does this truly imply that God is capable only of creating the best possible world? If God is only able to create the best possible creature, this appears to suggest that God is unable to create the not-the-best possible creatures, for his perfect nature prevents it, Thus, if φ is God's creation, φ must be, logically speaking, in its best possible form. But now there is a problem: given the omnipotence of God, this means that something which is “the best possible” for God would be semantically equivalent as “the perfect-possible.” Hence, in order for (K) to be true, it must be the case that:
(*K) Everything created by God ought to be perfect-possible in every respect.
But, then, what does this "perfect-possible in every respect" mean to God? Let us consider the following three-term relations:
Imperfect creature(C1) → Perfect-possible creature(C2) → Perfect creature(C3)
If we here suppose that "A→B" is informally defined as "compared to A, B is more perfect," we can conclude that the hierarchy of perfection would look something like the following:
(C1⁻) → (C1) → (C2⁻) → (C2) → (C3⁻) → (C3)[7]
We can immediately notice a peculiarity of this relationship. Given that (C1) is a particular imperfect creature and (C3) is a particular perfect creature, it logically follows that anything below the class (C3) must be regarded as an imperfect creature, for the fact that a given creature is “in the stage of becoming a perfect creature" or is "very close and nearly perfect," as in (C3⁻), does not in any way make that creature perfect─that is, (C3). Hence, letting <(A1)=set of imperfect creatures> and letting <(A2)=set of perfect creatures>, we can conclude:
(A1)={(C1⁻), (C1), (C2⁻), (C2), (C3⁻)}
(A2)={(C3)}
Provided that (A1)⊄(A2) and (A1)∩(A2)=Ø, we can accordingly draw an inference that being perfect is nothing to do with the matter of degree; anything is either perfect or imperfect, for there is nothing in between. In other words, something may either be close to or almost or nearly perfect but that is merely a different way of expressing that that something is in fact imperfect. Thus using an expression such as “perfect-possible creature” or "creature that has been created in a perfect-possible form" is essentially an acknowledgement that that creature is de facto imperfect or, to put it more precisely, this experssion merely means that the degree of the perfectness of that creature falls somewhere on the spectrum of imperfectness (C1⁻~C3⁻). But, as we have previous noted, if God is existentially and morally perfect and therefore cannot create anything that is contrary to his perfect nature, it ought to be impossible, in any way, for God to be able to create something that is imperfect. It is, however, conspicuous that this is untrue. Adam and Eve were perfectly created according to the Biblical account.[8] But it is also true that Adam and Eve had no knowledge of good and evil prior to the Fall, and they were clearly not omnipresent, omnipotent, nor omniscience, which suggests that some things were lacking from Adam and Eve. Now, if this “lack of something” per se implicates the negation of perfectness, we clearly do not have sufficient reasons to regard Adam and Eve as perfect; there is, after all, an explicit semantic distinction between the use of the word, “perfect,” since “Adam was created perfect” not in the sense that “God is perfect.”
(*Kp) God is able to create imperfect or not-the-best possible creatures.[9]
Because the abovementioned categorical propositions, (*K) and (*Kp) are, logically, mutually exclusive and we have a good reason to deny (*K), it seems necessary to accept (*Kp). Leibniz, of course, may advocate that lacking something does not per se entail imperfectness by suggesting that the very fact that God lacks evilness does not necessarily mean that He is imperfect. Two counterarguments, however, can be made against this: (i) <God lacking evilness=His imperfectness> and <God’s creature lacking certain component X=its imperfectness> are two distinctive claims, for the former is a necessary conclusion due to God’s nature, while there is nothing stopping us from concluding that God’s creatures, which lack certain qualities, are imperfect; (ii) if perfectness of being is a quality that is, in part, characterized by self-sufficiency and judgemental infallibility, Adam and Eve were not perfect. This is because they were, after all, fallible, incautious, and irresponsive, suggesting that, although it could be the case that they were created in a best possible way, they were not perfect anyways.[10] While it is true that Leibniz believes in human fallibility, as he, too, acknowledges that: “from an imperfection that was merely privative in the beginning, he[man] fell into something positively bad,”[11] if God is able to create any being within the set (A1), we can logically deduce that God is able to create imperfect creatures as well, confirming (*Kp). We have previously seen how (K) is in question. Let us now examine why this causes a problem:
<Any possible universe of any complexity would eventually have some evil in it. In any world where animals move around, for example, some of them are going to bump into others and hurt them, if only accidently. God—being all-good—chose the possible world in which the happiness of creatures is maximized and their suffering is minimized...>[12]
Leibniz argues for the necessity of evil as well as the necessity of, at least, some sufferings in the world by addressing how, in any given possible universe, suffering, either advertently or inadvertently, will inevitably occur and thus it must be the case that perfectly good God chose this world to be as it is to maximize the happiness of all existing agent. This is a somewhat reasonable theodicy, but the problem is that we can imagine the exact opposite as well─the possible world that is much better and happier to live in. To this type of presumption, Leibniz would respond by simply arguing that, since God is omniscient and we cannot, as imperfect beings, comprehend his divine utilitarian calculation, there is no guarantee that the possible world that seems better to us would also look the same to God, which only appears to lead us to agnosticism. Can we claim that Leibnizian argument is valid, then? Leibniz’s conclusion can be summarized as follows:
(Q1) If God is to create the world, he will choose to create the best possible world, based on his foreknowledge and omniscience, in which the happiness of all creature is maximized and sufferings minimized.
(Q2) In any given possible world of any complexity, some evil, either advertently or inadvertently, will inevitably occur.
(Q3) Although the world P has some inevitable evil in it, it must have been chosen by God, based on his foreknowledge and omniscience, as the best possible world there can be in which happiness of all creature is maximized and sufferings minimized.
We have earlier concluded that there is nothing stopping God from creating imperfect beings which refutes (Q1). How about (Q2) and (Q3)? They seem to imply that:
(P) God is unable to create the world without evil.
Even if Leibniz excuses God from the criticism that He is a direct cause of evil by arguing for the compatibility of God and evil,[13] it looks as though (P) is necessarily true according to his argument. Leibniz of course does not deny God’s omnipotence; he merely introduces free will to explain this paradoxical compatibility.[14] However, if this is so, God cannot create the world without evil precisely because of the nature of free will, not necessarily because “any possible universe of any complexity would eventually have some evil in it.”[15] This is because God is still able to create the world without evil if free will is denied─there is nothing stopping Him from creating the world without evil as long as free will is disallowed. Letting (PW1) as “the best possible world there can be” and (PW2) as “a set of possible worlds in which more or less evil is allowed compared to (PW1),” Leibniz’s possible world model can be illustrated as the following Venn diagram:
Figure 1: Leibniz’s possible world model
Notice (PW1)∩(PW2)={free will}. The problem that Leibnizian argument faces is that, given that (PW1) and (PW2) are mere subsets of (U), (PW1) and (PW2) are among many possible worlds. This means the impossibility of the free will-negated world is not guaranteed, as [(PW1)∪(PW2)]ᶜ does not have to be evil-free, provided that:
[(PW1)∩(PW2)]∩[(PW1)∪(PW2)]ᶜ=Ø
Or, even:
[(PW1)∪(PW2)]∩[(PW1)∪(PW2)]ᶜ=Ø
Let us define (ePWx) as "a set of possible worlds with evil" and (əPWx) as "a set of random possible worlds without evil." The problem is whether it could be the case that:
∃y∣əPWy⊂[(PW1)ᶜ∩(PW2)]
Or at least that:
∃y∣PWy⊂[(ePWx)ᶜ∩(əPWx)]
We have previously concluded that (*Kp) is true. But, because God is perfect, He can also create the utopia, suggesting that (Q3) is not necessarily deduced prima facie from God’s nature. Asserting that əPWx is impossible is in this sense denying the omnipotence of God. If God’s perfect nature prevents Him from the creation ex nihilo of not-the-best possible world, why should it be the case that God’s perfect nature prevents Him from the creation ex nihilo of evil-free world? Perhaps, to this conclusion, Leibniz may still argue that “...If the smallest evil that comes to pass in the world were missing in it, it would no longer be this world; which, with nothing omitted and all allowance made, was found the best by the Creator who chose it.”[16] What Leibniz means is that:
(Q4) If smallest evil is either added or lost from the current world, (PW1), then that world, (PW2), would no longer be this world and (PW2) would not be the best possible world accordingly.
This seems somewhat convincing. However, it does not rule out the possibility that an omnipotent being may choose to create (PW2) instead of (PW1), as this is entirely up to Him. And, given that there is no reason for God not to create the world without evil and that evil does not necessarily emerge in the absence of free will, it can be safely argued that (Q2) is not necessarily true, that is, not necessarily the case in a logical sense.[17] Consequently, given that God can surely create not-the-best possible world, that this world is the only best possible world is virtually groundless, for, (1) if God is capable only of making the best possible world, (PW1), (2) and if He can create different worlds in which more or less evil is allowed compared to the optimal world,[18] (3) then it follows therefore that that world, (PW2), can also be treated to be “the best possible world.” Hence, if the creation of this other world, (PW2), is in any way possible, then there is nothing stopping us from insisting that that other world, too, is the best possible world. Leibnizian theodicy as a result faces many limitations that force us to conclude that it is implausible and unconvincing.
Unlike Leibniz, Martin Luther (1483-1546), a father of the Protestant Reformation who stood against the corrupted ecclesiastical hegemony,[19] argued that God “does not cause distress, but [he] countenances it to make Christians realize that God alone helps, [and that] self-help can only fail,”[20] transforming the former aporia into a theological matter, rather than a metaphysical problem:
<...One recognizes the holy Christian people outwardly by the relic of the Holy Cross, that it must undergo all the misfortune and persecution, all sorts of tribulations and evil from the Devil, world, and flesh; inwardly mourn, be stupid, be frightened; outwardly poor, scorned, ill, weak, suffer; so that it can be like Christ, its head. And the reason for this must alone be that it holds fast to Christ and the Word of God, and suffers for Christ’s sake, Matt. 5: ‘Blessed are they who suffer persecution for my sake’>[21]
According to Luther, tribulation is not only natural facets of human lives, but is also something that Christians, believers of God, ought to willingly, or even happily, embrace as part of their obligations. Thus it makes sense that, considering that even Jesus claimed that all Christians will be hated due to preaching him,[22] Luther believes one can never comprehend the Bible “without experience and tribulations”[23] and that he states “…be confident of entering heaven through many tribulations rather than through the false security of peace” in the 95 theses posted in 1517.[24] Though Luther of course advertently limits the subjects of tribulation and suffering only to Christians rather than the humanity as a whole, this approach is consistent with the previous analysis. (1) If the standard of good is God Himself and thence anything that opposes God is evil,[25] (2) so-called “good people” would refer to the believers who do the things that God wants them to do and, conversely, so-called “bad people” would refer to those who do not, (3) it therefore does make sense that Luther regarded the followers of the Christ, although fallible and imperfect sinners, as the good people.
All human beings are unworthy so much so that no one is virtuous enough to be present before God; Luther, too, regarded himself as being unworthy to “appear before the Holy God.”[26] Such a sense of unworthiness dramatically led him to tackle one of the most challenging theodicial aporia─the cause of suffering. We tend to assume that good person should not face tribulation. But in reality this assumption is meaningless precisely because no one is good after all. Paul asserts that “There is no one righteous, not even one...”[27] and Solomon claims that “There is not a righteous man on earth who does what is right and never sins.”[28] Because we are so unworthy before God, we do not even have rights to question the cause of the suffering. We can observe this by numerous Biblical heroes: Noah gets drunk and becomes naked;[29] Moses distrusts God;[30] Gideon creates an ephod to exult his victory;[31] king David seduces Bathsheba and in doing so let her husband Uriah be killed;[32] David counts the fighting men of his kingdom, motivated by pride;[33] king Solomon worships other gods, dismissing the divine command,[34] and many more.
Lutheran theodicy is quite successful, for it denies the popular presumption that good people do exist. If God of the Bible truly exists and if we are nothing but hopeless sinners as traditional Christian world view depicts, the very idea that we do have rights to question God’s judicial authority is nothing more than human pride. Then what good is the evil world? The presence of evil concurrently makes us stronger and helps us mature as an experienced human being. As Irenaeus, too, once pointed out: “God set up the universe so that we can learn from our experience and grow in goodness and strength of character. If we never faced setbacks, we would remain childishly shallow. [Thus] The suffering and difficulties we face are opportunities to become more patient, courageous, and loving. ...”[35]
In this sense, suffering is “an indispensable spur to human aspiration and achievement.” [36] This prima facie appears quite similar to Leibnizian argument in a way that both claim the indispensability of evil─the only difference between them is how they explicate and approach the problem of evil. According to Luther, the presence of evil eventually forces us to seek God and His mercy. There are, again, many Biblical examples in support of this notion: (1) Jacob, in distress, prays to God prior to confronting his brother Esau,[37] (2) Israelites turn to God for help after being disobedient,[38] (3) Elijah asks God for help after being intimidated by the queen of Israel, Jezebel,[39] (4) Jehoahaz, king of Israel, pleads God for help,[40] (5) Hezekiah prays to God to deliver Israelites from the hand of Assyrians,[41] (6) Hezekiah cries out for mercy of God due to his illness,[42] and finally (7) Jesus turns to God in times of distress and sorrow.[43]
Perhaps, among all Biblical figure, Job is arguably the most striking character when it comes to the matter of suffering and evil. Job was a “blameless and upright, feared God and turned away from evil.”[44] Job nonetheless undergoes intense and disastrous experiences─death of his children, lost wealth and health. While the book of Job focuses on how innocent Job was, it also underscores how, even Job, faced tribulation apparently for no reason. Job’s reaction to all this is yet quite impressive: “Naked I came from my mother’s womb, and naked I will depart. The LORD gave and the LORD has taken away; may the name of the LORD be praised.”[45] What is remarkable with this response is that Job did not only seek God in times of distress, but accept it as something natural─almost as though he anticipated all of it. Job, through his faith, not only became a fine Christian model under difficult circumstances but also revealed the value of tribulation, as Nietzsche once wrote: "What doesn't kill you makes you stronger".[46]
The book of Job of course does not tell us anything about “why” Job had to experience such a dreadful continuum of catastrophes and “for whose sake” God permitted the Devil to harass Job, and “how” God’s perfect nature could cohere with all this without contradicting God Himself. Rather, the Book of Job is silent on such matters which seems to suggest that theological attempts to explain the problem of evil is de facto ephemeral before God, leading some scholars to believe that the book of Job “actually deconstructs theodicy rather than supports it.”[47] Still, what the book of Job tells us is surprisingly simple─through the tribulation, one can “learn how to speak of God in the midst of suffering.” This resonate with Luther’s remarks: “The Devil takes care of strong Christians”[48]
Admittedly, Luther’s view has two major weaknesses as well. First, unlike Leibniz, Luther denies free will of human agent[49] which obviously evoke some serious problems including the fact that God cannot and ought not punish the wrongdoer, as whatever we human beings presumably choose to do or decide to do cannot, in any way, be regarded as their purely willful actions. One can, for instance, rape, murder and steal and yet avoid juridical punishment by simply arguing that “since everything is predetermined in this world, I had no choice but to rape, murder and steal and hence I am not responsible in any way for my actions; such actions were merely a preordained part of the hardwired causal relationship in this materialistic world.” It therefore seems manifest that negation of free will in itself entail the negation of moral responsibility. Although it is understandable that Luther’s attack on free will is largely based on his disgust toward Renaissance humanism and his pressure to emphasize the magnificence of God, the negation of free will nonetheless causes some issues within Lutheran theodicy. Secondly, though suffering may sometimes lead us to the so-called post-traumatic growth, there is no guarantee whatsoever that suffering will lead us to seek God or to pray. In other words, Luther is presupposing that:
(Q) If we face tribulation, we will then inevitably seek God which in turn will make us grow in faith.
Unfortunately, the antecedent of (Q) does not always lead to the consequent of (Q). There is no deductive or imperative correlation between the antecedent of (Q) and the consequent of (Q) since the former does not necessitate the latter; one can, after all, seek other means of comfort such as drugs, alcohol, sex, etc.─not to mention that one can worship other gods. Moreover, as many scholars correctly point out, even though one can be spiritually strengthened through pains and hardships, it may certainly kill us.[50] To this, Luther may simply claim that the one who indulges oneself with things other than seeking God in times of distress is merely the one just not yet ready for the cross.
Knowing that everyone is unworthy to appear before God, the fact that tribulation may even destroy our lives is not surprising; we are, after all, born to die in that way since we are undeserved sinners from the birth. This is therefore not a significant problem within Lutheran theodicy. Although Luther does not explain how the compatibility of God and evil can theologically cohere to the extent that Leibniz does, it seems Luther’s aphoristic Soul-Building theodicy is, at least, more promising over Leibniz’s Best Possible World theodicy, for Leibniz limits God’s omnipotence under the logic of possible world while Luther acknowledges the unworthiness of the humanity as well as the transcendence of the perfect God.
We have previously examined how Leibniz’s Best Possible World theodicy and Luther’s Soul-Building theodicy attempt to solve the problem of evil. Leibniz introduces evil as a necessary part of the world but this approach limits God’s ability and is based on baseless premises. The latter, on the other hand, attempts to clarify the presence of evil by interpreting it as something that strengthens us, Given that Luther’s theodicy presupposes the omnipotence of God while denying free will and that Leibniz’s theodicy acknowledges free will while denying (although Leibniz would strongly disagree) the omnipotence of God, it seems both theodicies can eclectically work together to deal with the hard problem of evil. Whether this aporia can be sufficiently solved via such eclecticization would be, for now, a topic for another paper.
Bibliography
Amiri, Felix. Viral Truth and Precepts. Bloomington: Xlibris Corporation, 2008.
Birnbaum, David. God and Evil. Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House, Inc, 1989.
Castelo, Daniel. Theological Theodicy. Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2012.
Copan, et al. God and Evil. Westmont: InterVarsity Press, 2013.
Jezneel, Adiel, A. Christianity: Yesterday and Today. New York: Logical Alternatives, 2005.
Morreal, John and Tamara Sonn. The Religion Toolkit. Singapore: Markono Print Media Pte Ltd, 2012.
Murray, Michele. A Concise Introduction to World Religions. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols. Hackett Publishing, 1997.
Oberman, Heiko A. Luther: Man between God and the Devil. London: Yale University Press, 1989.
Roth, John, K. Problems of the Phiilosophy of religion. Bel Air: Chandler Publishing Company, 1971.
Segal, Jerome, M. Agency, Illusion, and well-being: Essays in Moral Psychology and Phiosophical Economics. New York: Lexington Books, 2009.
The Holy Bible, New International Version. Seoul: Kim, 2011.
Notes
[1] John Morreal and Tamara Sonn, The Religion Toolkit. (Singapore: Markono Print Media Pte Ltd, 2012.), 19; Daniel Castelo, Theological Theodicy. (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2012.), 4.
[2] Heiko, A. Oberman, Luther: Man between God and the Devil. (London: Yale University Press, 1989), 185, 285.
[3] Castelo, Theological Theodicy., 4.
[4] Ibid, 5.
[5] Adiel, A. Jezneel, Christianity: Yesterday and Today. (New York: Logical Alternatives, 2005), 321; Jerome, M. Segal, Agency, Illusion, and well-being: Essays in Moral Psychology and Phiosophical Economics. (New York: Lexington Books, 2009.), 81; Psalms 7: 11; John 5: 30; Joel 3: 12-4; Genesis 18: 25.
[6] Castelo, Theological Theodicy., 6.
[7] The minus superscript indicates that the level of hierarchy of perfectness of creature is approaching to a certain level of hierarchy of perfectness (ex. (C2)) from the lower level of perfectness. (ex. (C1))
[8] Genesis 1: 26-31.
[9] This is based on the narrative of Genesis.
[10] Morreal and Tamara Sonn, The Religion Toolkit., 160; Felix Amiri, Viral Truth and Precepts. (Bloomington: Xlibris Corporation, 2008.), 38.
[11] Copan, et al., God and Evil. (Westmont: InterVarsity Press, 2013.), 98.
[12] Morreal and Tamara Sonn, The Religion Toolkit., 19.
[13] Castelo, Theological Theodicy., 6; John, K. Roth, Problems of the Phiilosophy of religion. (Bel Air: Chandler Publishing Company, 1971.), 84.
[14] Copan, et al., God and Evil., 98.
[15] Morreal and Tamara Sonn, The Religion Toolkit., 19.
[16] Castelo, Theological Theodicy., 5.
[17] Morreal and Tamara Sonn, The Religion Toolkit., 19.
[18] This optimal world refers to the default world, (PW1), with some necessary evil in it.
[19] Morreal and Tamara Sonn, The Religion Toolkit., 165; Michele Murray, A Concise Introduction to World Religions. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.), 186.
[20] Oberman, Luther: Man between God and the Devil., 176.
[21] Ibid., 255.
[22] Matthew 10: 22.
[23] Oberman, Luther: Man between God and the Devil., 185.
[24] Ibid., 264; Morreal and Tamara Sonn, The Religion Toolkit., 164-5.
[25] Jezneel, Christianity: Yesterday and Today., 321.
[26] Oberman, Luther: Man between God and the Devil., 137.
[27] Rome 3: 10.
[28] Ecclesiastes 8: 10.
[29] Genesis 9: 21.
[30] Exodus 4: 10-4.
[31] Judges 8: 30.
[32] 2 Samuel 11: 2-27.
[33] Ibid., 24: 1-17.
[34] 1 Kings 11: 1-13.
[35] Morreal and Tamara Sonn, The Religion Toolkit., 19.
[36] David Birnbaum, God and Evil. (Hoboken: Ktav Publishing House, Inc, 1989.), 19.
[37] Genesis 32: 4-12.
[38] Judges 3: 9, 15; 6: 6-8; 10: 10-6.
[39] 1 Kings 19: 1-21.
[40] 2 Kings 13: 4.
[41] 2 Kings 19: 14-9.
[42] Ibid., 20: 1-3.
[43] Matt. 26: 36-44; Mark 14: 32-9; Luke 22: 41-4.
[44] Job 1: 1.
[45] Ibid., 1: 21.
[46] F. Nietzsche, Twilight of Idols, 1888.
[47] Castelo, Theological Theodicy., 26.
[48] Oberman, Luther: Man between God and the Devil., 176.
[49] Morreal and Tamara Sonn, The Religion Toolkit., 165.
[50] Castelo, Theological Theodicy., 74.
