<when nudges fail>

By Lauren Willis

Quote from <forword to the Korean edition>

"But as with many successful ideas, nudges have their limits. Where firms implementing a nudge have interests at odds with citizens' interests, firms can and will subvert the nudge. In the case of default settings put in place by policymakers, when firms have significant control over the process for opting out or the context in which the faults are presented, firms can undermine the stickness of defaults. Further, individuals who generate the most revenue for firms by opting out may be the very people who ould benefit most from the default position. Thus, firms may design the opt-out process and surrounding frame not only to make a default slippery in general but specifically to encourage those who are worse off outside the default to opt out. In these situations, policy defaults may give the appearance of helping consumers, while doing little more than helping firms defuse political demands for substantive consumer protection."