The Zangezur Corridor is a proposed transportation route intended to connect mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic by passing through Armenia’s Syunik Province (historically called Zangezur).
1. Geographic Context
• Mainland Azerbaijan is separated from Nakhchivan by southern Armenia (Syunik Province).
• Iran lies immediately south of Syunik, and Turkey borders Nakhchivan to the west.
• The corridor would run roughly east–west, cutting across southern Armenia near the towns of Meghri and Kapan.
2. Political Background
• The idea of the corridor emerged prominently after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (Sep–Nov 2020).
• The November 10, 2020 trilateral ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Russia (brokered by Moscow) included Clause 9, which states that:
• All economic and transport links in the region shall be unblocked.
• Armenia shall guarantee transport links between western Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, under the supervision of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Border Guard Service.
• Azerbaijan interprets this as granting an extraterritorial corridor free of Armenian customs or border checks;
Armenia insists it only agreed to reopen routes under Armenian sovereignty.
3. Strategic Importance
For Azerbaijan:
• Direct land connection to Nakhchivan and, via Turkey, to the rest of the Turkic world (“pan-Turkic” vision).
Reduces dependence on routes through Iran.
For Turkey:
• Creates a direct link with Azerbaijan without crossing Iranian territory.
• Fits into the “Middle Corridor” trade strategy linking Turkey–Caucasus–Central Asia–China.
For Russia:
• Extends Russian military/border guard presence in Armenia.
• Gives Moscow leverage over regional trade routes.
For Armenia:
• Risk of losing control over a key strip of territory in Syunik.
• However, reopening routes could restore rail/road access to Russia via Azerbaijan.
For Iran:
• Strongly opposes any extraterritorial corridor cutting it off from Armenia.
• Has increased military presence near the Armenia–Iran border.
4. Current Status (2025)
• No fully functional corridor yet. Negotiations are deadlocked.
• Azerbaijan has built infrastructure on its side up to the Armenian border.
• Armenia has pushed for reopening existing Soviet-era rail lines under Armenian law, not as a sovereign Azerbaijani route.
• Iran has joined Armenia in opposing the “corridor” concept, favoring regular transit under Armenian jurisdiction.
• Tensions in 2021–2023 saw occasional border skirmishes and mutual accusations.
5. Historical Roots
• The Zangezur region was historically contested between Armenia and Azerbaijan after the collapse of the Russian Empire (1918–1921).
• The Soviet Union awarded Zangezur to the Armenian SSR, isolating Nakhchivan from mainland Azerbaijan.
• Rail and road connections did exist in Soviet times, but they were severed after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1990s).
6. Wider Geopolitical Implications
• China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The corridor could serve as part of an east–west route bypassing Russia and Iran.
• EU interest: Alternative connectivity to Central Asia without relying on Russia.
• Potential flashpoint: If Azerbaijan tries to establish the corridor by force, it could trigger regional escalation involving Turkey, Iran, and Russia.