일본 경쟁법 동향—링크드인 포스트들

최근 일본 경쟁법과 관련해서 링크드인에 여러 포스트를 올렸는데, 개인적으로도 좀 보기 편하게 모아둘 필요가 있고 또 한국의 관심있는 분들께 공유하면 좋을 것 같아서 글을 쓰게 되었다.

첫째는 일본 공정거래위원회의 인력과 예산 확충 소식이다. 한국도 최근 새로운 정부가 들어서면서 특히 거래상 우월적 지위 남용 규율들(꼭 공정거래법뿐만 아니라 가맹사업법, 하도급법 등)의 집행과 관련하여 공정거래위원회의 인력 확충이 예상되고 있는데, 일본 역시 비슷한 맥락에서 최근 인력 확충과 예산 증액을 계획하고 있다고 한다. 출처는 아래 링크에서 확인할 수 있다.

Both the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) and the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) are expecting to expand their organizations in 2025.

First, on August 29, the JFTC announced its budget request for fiscal year 2026, seeking an effective increase of approximately 5.7% over the previous year. (See, https://lnkd.in/gakJqXTx)

In terms of enforcement, the largest budget allocation, around 12%, is devoted to addressing abuse of superior bargaining position, including the enforcement of the recently amended Subcontract Act and the newly established Freelancer Act. The next largest category is general Antimonopoly Act enforcement, around 4.35%. And, for "improving the competition environment", including digital market studies, the JFTC allocated around 2.44%. Notably, this category encompasses the budget for the newly introduced Mobile Software Competition Act (MSCA), scheduled for implementation by the end of the year.

Regarding personnel, the budget request emphasizes the establishment of several new director-level posts, as well as a notable increase of 59 officials dedicated to the enforcement of 'fair transactions' (I think, this indicates the prohibitions of abuse of superior bargaining position). An additional 4 officials are requested for implementing the 'competition policy', which may be related to the introduction of MSCA, although it's not clear from the documentation.

Second, Korea. While not yet finalized, staff expansion appears very likely following presidential instructions in June and again on September 30.
(See, https://lnkd.in/gZYAdS45 and https://lnkd.in/gMfiEvVY)

On September 1, it was reported that the KFTC is considering increasing its headcount by around 150 employees, roughly a 20% rise from 647 in February, and reorganizing its divisions by establishing a new Subcontracting Bureau and a Franchise Bureau, bringing together existing units to strengthen enforcement against abuse of superior bargaining position, in a move similar to Japan. The agency is also considering allocating more officials for economic analysis, adding a second Economic Analysis Division.
(See, https://lnkd.in/gjxMbXFP)

Officially, on October 1, the KFTC announced a dedicated task force to improve law enforcement and streamline case procedures. Although staff expansion was not mentioned, it is certainly part of the background.
(See, https://lnkd.in/gykr9SkN)

Link to this post: https://lnkd.in/g3xPfq4z

(Uploaded: October 5, 2025)

둘째는, 일본 공정거래위원회의 집행 활성화 경향이다. 위와 같은 조직 확장은 물론 어느 정도는 최근 도입된 스마트폰법(Mobile Software Competition Act) 시행을 위한 것이기는 하나, 꼭 그것 때문만이라고 볼 수는 없다. 앞에서 말했듯이 좀 더 주된 이유는 일본도 거래상 우월적 지위 남용 규율들(꼭 독점금지법의 규정만이 아니라 최근 개정된 하도급법, 새로 도입된 프리랜서법 등도 포함)의 집행을 위해 더 많은 자원이 필요한 것이 있고, 이보다 더 중요하게는 최근 일본 경쟁법 집행이 전체적으로 강화되는 추세에 있다는 배경도 있다. 자세한 내용은 아래 포스트에서 확인할 수 있다.

It now seems clearer that competition enforcement in Japan is gradually coming back to life, as I cautiously speculated earlier, https://lnkd.in/gcxUBB5s.

According to the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), the agency's enforcement surged to a decade high in FY2024. On 1 May 2025, the JFTC reported 24 legal measures in FY2024—21 cease-and-desist orders and 3 commitments. That’s up from (totalling) 9 in FY2023, and it's a clear signal of tougher enforcement. The media called it a “decade-high” (Asahi) and a “record, decade-high” (MLex), and practitioners also flagged the jump (AMT). The FY2024 measures spanned cartels, bid-rigging, allocation, UTPs, private monopolization, abuse of superior bargaining position, and tying—with the JFTC explicitly listing 21 orders (incl. 4 price cartels, 6 bid-rigging, 6 allocation, 5 UTPs) and 3 commitments (private monopolization, ASBP, tying). (This paragraph is a ChatGPT's summary)

Part of the FY2024 surge may simply reflect a rebound from the unusually low enforcement numbers during the COVID years—but I hope that FY2025 will be stronger.

As is known, Japan's enforcement has weakened for a long time, while Korea Korea Fair Trade Commission has shown a steady trend of stronger enforcement. Beyond the broader context—Korea’s post-1998 IMF-driven liberalisation versus Japan’s limited policy focus on competition—I believe the 2013 reform, which repealed the JFTC’s quasi-judicial first-instance function, may have been a sad turning point. (my previous post, here: https://lnkd.in/gdBRDz9Q).

The cultural and institutional constraints still remain, but this renewed momentum is encouraging. Very much hope the JFTC’s revival continues.

JFTC's press release: https://lnkd.in/g5sWrhU7
Asahi: https://lnkd.in/gwXcAJGi
MLex: https://lnkd.in/gbya-7mv
AMT: https://lnkd.in/g9-sh3a2

Link to this post: https://lnkd.in/gbTG4DJv

(Uploaded on: September 6, 2025)

셋째는, 독점금지법(한국의 공정거래법에 대응)의 거래상 우월적 지위 남용 규정에 기한 제재 시작의 신호탄인 Harley-Davidson 결정과 Edion 판결이다.

일본 경쟁법에 대해서 조금이라도 들어본 사람이라면, 한국 공정거래위원회와 달리 일본 공정거래위원회는 시정조치 명령과 과징금 부과에 극히 소극적이란 걸 알고 있을 것이다. 틀린 것은 아니지만, 이 지식에는 업데이트가 필요하다. 한국과 일본의 문화 차이에 대한 인식도 어느 정도 필요한데, 한국에서는 법 집행이 매우 실험적으로, 적극적으로 이뤄지고 그에 따른 집행 오류는 법원의 심사 과정에서 교정되는 경향이 있지만, 일본에서는 반대로 법 집행이 매우 안정적으로, 소극적으로 이뤄지고, 집행 초기부터 집행 오류를 최소화하려는 경향이 있다. 거래상 우월적 지위 남용 규정의 경우도 마찬가지로, 한국에서는 일단 계속 집행하고 동시에 처분의 타당성을 다투면서 법리가 발전해왔지만, 일본에서는 (2009년 법 개정으로 시정조치 명령시 과징금 부과가 의무로 바뀐 이후) 2010년대 초반 5건의 결정을 낸 뒤, 공식적 제재 결정 없이, 위 건들에 대한 항소 결과를 기다리는 시간이 있었다.

그리고 최근 도쿄고등법원의 Edion 사건 판결이 나왔으며, 공정거래위원회의 (거의) 전부 승소로 결론이 나왔다. 내가 알기론, 이로써 위 다섯 사건 모두 어느 정도 결론이 난 것인데 (대법원까지 갈 것인지는 모르겠다) 대체로 일본 공정거래위원회의 손을 들어준만큼, 앞으로 카르텔이나 입찰담합 외에도 남용 영역에 있어서 더 많은 공식적 법 위반 결정들을 볼 수 있게 될 것으로 생각한다. 실제로, 이 판결 이후 일본 공정거래위원회는 최근 Harley-Davidson 사건에서 기존처럼 확약으로 사건을 종료하지 않고 시정명령과 과징금 부과 결정을 내리는 선택을 하기도 했다. 자세한 내용은 아래 확인.

Congratulations to the Japan Fair Trade Commission! Following its win in the RALSE case in March 2021, the agency has secured another clean appellate victory against EDION Corporation (a large consumer-electronics retailer in Japan) before the Tokyo High Court.

On September 12, 2025, the court dismissed Edion’s appeal in full and upheld the JFTC’s 2012 enforcement (as modified by the JFTC’s October 2019 hearing decision), finding an abuse of superior bargaining position (ASBP) over dependent suppliers. According to the JFTC, Edion forced suppliers to dispatch their employees for pre-opening store work and other store setup tasks. Specifically, the conduct was documented as 3,165 dispatches across 133 store openings involving 92 suppliers (initially 127 suppliers, reduced to 92 in the 2019 hearings). For these practices, the agency imposed a cease-and-desist order and a surcharge (=fine) (initially about ¥4.05 billion, reduced in 2019 to ¥3.032 billion). The court upheld these measures in full.

In my view, this win is highly significant.

As far as I know, it is one of five major ASBP cases* in which the JFTC issued both cease-and-desist orders and surcharges, following the introduction of mandatory surcharges under the 2010 amendments. Back in the 2010s, the agency sought to enforce the law more strictly in line with the amendments, but, strikingly, all addressees contested the decisions. To my understanding, such immediate and overt pushback—unusual in Japan’s business culture, in my view—combined with the legal uncertainty after the 2010 amendments, chilled ASBP enforcement. Now, however, the Tokyo High Court has issued a judgment fully supporting the JFTC.

This may be more of a hopeful expectation than a firmly grounded prediction, but I believe the RALSE and now Edion** are encouraging outcomes that should bolster the JFTC’s commitment to pursue full-dress ASBP cases, with orders and hefty surcharges, beyond accepting commitments from businesses.

* EDION (2012) → Direx (2014.1) → Toys “R” Us (2014.12) → Sanyo Marunaka (2019.3) → RALSE (2019.10)
** By way of exception, in Sanyo Marunaka, the Tokyo High Court set aside the JFTC’s decision on procedural grounds in December 2020, followed by a new JFTC decision in January 2021.

Link to this post: https://lnkd.in/gk2fTbqV

(Uploaded on: September 13, 2025)

The Japan Fair Trade Commission sanctioned Harley-Davidson Motor Company, issuing a cease-and-desist order and a surcharge (=fine), for abusing its superior bargaining position (ASBP) over its dealers. Put simply, it’s a sales-quota case; the company unilaterally imposed excessively demanding sales quotas on its dealers and threatened (and, in some instances, carried out) non-renewal of exclusive dealership agreements for those who failed to meet the targets.

This case further strengthens my view that dependence-based competition provisions—namely, ASBP, abuse of economic dependence, or abuse of relative market power—may contribute to more transparent, reciprocal, and balanced business, industry governance.

In light of Japanese law, this case is very noteworthy, I think. It appears to be the first ASBP decision imposing a cease-and-desist order and a surcharge since the early-2010s quintet—Sanyo-Marunaka (22 Jun 2011), Toys’R’Us (13 Dec 2011), Edion (16 Feb 2012), Ralse (3 Jul 2013), and Direx (5 Jun 2014)—after which formal ASBP enforcement largely went dormant amid unexpected appeals and legal uncertainty. Indeed, since Direx in 2014, as far as I know, the JFTC has not imposed ASBP sanctions, only resolving matters through commitment decisions. However, in this case, the JFTC boldly reinstated its previous sanctioning practice, and I think this Harley-Davidson case may signal the enforcer's restored, renewed willingness to pursue ASBP cases to formal orders and surcharges. I guess, perhaps, they gained confidence after the Tokyo High Court upheld the JFTC in Ralse (2021) and in Edion (2025). My previous post: https://lnkd.in/gk2fTbqV

Personally, I'm happy to see recent signals of the revival of the JFTC, and happy to reaffirm my belief, through this case, that dependence-based provisions—namely, abuse of economic dependence and abuse of a superior bargaining position—can foster fairer, that is, more transparent, reciprocal, and balanced business and industry governance. https://lnkd.in/gb74nZTJ

As for the JFTC's five ASBP cases, see Masako Wakui and Thomas Cheng (2015): https://lnkd.in/geX8NTXy

JFTC's press release, on Sep 18, 2025 (in Japanese): https://lnkd.in/gnva6afE
And, an English report, Nippon.com, 'Harley-Davidson Fined for Excessive Sales Quotas in Japan' (Sep 18, 2025) https://lnkd.in/gkiDU-KM

Link to this post: https://lnkd.in/g7VYd_Pi

(Uploaded on: September 21, 2025)

넷째는, 스마트폰법(MSCA) 집행 가이드라인 발표 소식이다. 아무리 기존 독점금지법과 특별법들의 집행이 중요해도, 역시 곧 전면 시행을 앞둔 스마트폰법(MSCA)을 빼놓고 이야기할 순 없을 것이다.

지난 7월 일본 공정거래위원회는 법의 내용을 구체적으로 설명하는 가이드라인을 발표했고, 이에 대해 Alba Ramirez의 글을 함께(?) 썼었다. 다만 이번에는 나는 저자 이름에서 빼달라고 부탁했는데, 가장 큰 이유는 역시 지난번 Kluwer Competition Law Blog 포스트 때도 그랬지만 이번에도 거의 사실 대부분의 초안 작업은 Alba가 했기 때문이기도 하고(아무리 제2저자라고 해도, 또 블로그 포스트라고 해도, 난 여전히 적은 기여로 예컨대 30%도 되지 않는 적은 기여로 'authorship'을 갖는 게 좀 불편하다), 좀 더 근본적으로는 일본 스마트폰법 식의 경쟁 규제적 접근에 대해서 약간의 시각 차이가 있기 때문이기도 했다. (물론 내가 예전 경쟁저널 글에서 밝힌 것처럼, 일본 입장에서는 단순히 디지털 경쟁 규제를 마련한다는 차원 외에도 경쟁법 집행에 대해서 대중의 지지를 확보해야 하는 현실적 이유가 있었다는 것을 이해는 한다.) 그리고 다른 일본 학자들의 눈치가 보여서 이번에는 조심스러운 탓도 약간 있었고.

아무튼. 글은 아래에서 확인할 수 있다. 한국 사람들이 관심이 있어 보인다면, 이번에 발표된 정령과 시행규칙 그리고 가이드라인에 대해서 별도로 한국어 글을 쓸, '생각'을 하고 있다. 계획은 아직 없다.

As I posted earlier, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) has announced its plan to increase both its budget and personnel for FY2026, preparing for the enforcement of the MSCA, which is set to take effect by the end of this year. https://lnkd.in/gnj-VtRX

If you are curious about how the enforcement might unfold next year, I highly recommend Alba Ribera Martínez’s excellent Kluwer piece—she carefully reviews the newly issued Cabinet Order, Enforcement Rules, and Guidelines, offering valuable insights into what we can expect from future enforcement. I strongly recommend it to my network.

Personally, I hope that through the MSCA, the JFTC will gain broader public support, and through this it could successfully reinvigorate the strong enforcement, a process that has already begun to take shape! https://lnkd.in/gbTG4DJv

(Uploaded on: October 7, 2025)

그리고 마지막은 별 것은 아니고, 지난 서울국제경쟁포럼에서 나온 이야기들에 대한 포스트다. 플랫폼 규제 관련, 한국은 미국과 큰 갈등을 보이고 있지만 일본은 그렇지 않았다는 내용의 기사에 대해서, 한국인 입장에서 약간의 해명(?) 또는 코멘트를 한 포스트다. 포스트를 올린 뒤 기사를 쓴 Charles McConnell로부터 메시지를 받기도 했는데(좋은 말이었다-고 믿는다), 이렇게 약간씩 이슈가 생기는 걸 보면, 한국과 일본 영구자들 모두, 아무리 법학이지만, 자국 내에서만 이야기 하지 않고 함께 밖으로 나와서 다른 나라 사람들과 함께 논의에 참여했으면 좋겠다는... 생각을 해본다. (최근, 내가 링크드인을 열심히 하는 것을 구직활동 정도로 낮춰보는 말을 들어서 조금 속상한 마음에 써봤다.)

Interesting article comparing Korea and Japan's situations on platform regulation. It reports on Japan's smooth implementation of the MSCA (Mobile Software Competition Act), free from US pressure, quoting JFTC Japan Fair Trade Commission Chair Chatani’s words that the jurisdiction remains “very friendly with the US platforms, including Google and Apple.” Meanwhile, regarding Korea, the recent pushback from the US and the continuing calls for legislative action from the National Assembly are introduced.

Well, what the report says is somewhat misleading. First, regarding differences: in Korea as well, there is legislation targeted only at app store practices by Apple and Google, which passed even before the DMA without serious resistance. The coverage of the problematic Korean bills at issue now is broader than mobile ecosystems. Second, even before Trump’s return, Korea’s bills had already faced serious criticism from the public, academia, and local businesses. US pressure may be just an added spice.

That said, let’s assume that there are differences. What explains such differences? Apart from the US perspective and legal reasons, which I’ve already discussed (https://lnkd.in/gV_uGgCQ), I think the different cultural settings of the two, which operate as informal institutions, may provide an explanation (hypothesis for my future research).

In Japan, I personally feel that “you benefit if you blend in.” As the saying goes, a nail that sticks out gets hammered down.

In Korea, I assure you that “you benefit if you speak up.” Here, the nail that sticks out gets hammered too (as is true in almost all Asian countries...), though, in Korea, the nail that stays down (like me...) gets drilled even more heavily.
(Of course, these are broad-brush impressions, but I think they help capture the cultural differences quite quickly. While I personally feel more comfortable and safe in Japan, if you’re outspoken and don’t shy away from a fight, Korea might suit you better.)

Under these different settings, I was thinking that rational businesses in the two jurisdictions have also been responding to legislative actions differently.

For example, for Google and Apple, it’s better to follow and cooperate with the Japanese government. For the same player, however, in Korea, it’s better to be loud (as long as you can withstand the hammer, for a short time), because then you can gain even greater rewards.

It’s by the way fascinating to try to look into rational actors' choices under various formal and informal institutional constraints.

Charles McConnell, 'JFTC chair downplays US tech concerns as Korea faces pushback' GCR (Sep 3, 2025) https://lnkd.in/gb5EFQqC

Link to this post: https://lnkd.in/gadPUVWD

(Uploaded on: September 4, 2025)

당연하게도, 내가 포스트들로 정리한 것들은 일본 경쟁법에서 벌어지는 일들 중 우연히 내가 알게 되고 또 내가 관심있어서 선별한 극히 일부분들로, 실제 일본 경쟁법의 전체 동향과는 거리가 있다. 다만, 이정도마저도 한국에선 잘 알려지지 않고 있어서(아무래도 미국과 유럽 외에는 관심이 별로 없는 것 같다), 혹시 필요한 분들께는 참고가 되었으면 좋겠다.

(대가를 바라는 것은 아니지만, 그래도 혹시 하시는 연구에 도움이 되었다면, 경쟁저널 글이나 Kluwer Blog 글이라도 인용해주시면 감사하겠습니다)